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Recent studies find that the 1990s economic expansion substantially improved the 
absolute and relative economic positions of less skilled and less educated Americans.1 
The national unemployment rate started at 6.8 percent in 1991 and fell to 4.3 percent in 
2001, setting a new record of 120 months. For 34 months, from August 1998 to May 
2001, the jobless rate was at or below 4.5 percent. Employment rates of most 
demographic groups, especially youth and minorities, reached historic highs, eroding 
some of the persistent and historical barriers to work. 
 
The economy’s ability to reduce barriers to work can partly be attributed to the 
willingness of policy makers not to slow growth for fear of inflation. Even with estimates 
that indicated that the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) had 
fallen, sentiments among policy makers and economists were that the low unemployment 
rates were unsustainable. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors began a series of 
increases in the Federal Funds rate on June 30, 1999. On that date the rate was increased 
25 basis points to 5.0 percent. From that point to May 2000, the board increased the 
Federal Funds rate five times, raising the rate to 6.5 percent. For the remainder of 2000, 
the Board of Governors kept the Federal Funds Rate at 6.5 percent. Even though the 
board began to see a moderation in economic activity, it still felt that “the risks continue 
to be weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures 
in the foreseeable future.” It was not until the Board of Governors’ December 19, 2000 
meeting that the economy had slowed enough that they shifted their bias “toward 
conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.”  
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Reimers (2000), Freeman and Rodgers (2000), Freeman (2001), 
Hoynes, Hines, and Krueger (2001). A second round of studies continues to find gains, 
but they have not made up the lost ground that occurred from the 1970s to 1980s (Holzer 
and Offner 2004; Milanovich 2002). 
 2
In fact, by November 2001, the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee felt that it 
had accumulated enough evidence to conclude that March 2001, three months after the 
Federal Reserve shifted its bias, marked the beginning of a recession. On July 17th, 2003 
the Dating Committee determined that a trough in business activity occurred in the 
economy in November 2001. This trough signaled the end of the 8-month recession that 
had started March 2001. 
 
Using November 2001 as the recession’s end yields an economic contraction that 
lasted 8 months, making it the second shortest recession since 1969. Over this 8-month 
period, the U.S. unemployment rate rose from 4.3 to 5.6 percent, with labor force 
participation falling from 67.1 to 66.7 percent. Although mild by historical standards, 
published Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that a portion of the gains from the 1990s 
boom to less skilled and less educated Americans has been eroded. Since November 
2001, the economy has shown signs of recovery. Nonfarm payroll employment, one of 
the indicators on which the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee bases its decision, 
has begun to trend upward, albeit not until the beginning of 2004. 
 
This chapter takes a forward-looking approach. I forecast the post recession labor 
market experiences of less skilled men and women (nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-olds). 
The Bush Administration forecasts predict that the unemployment rate will end 2004 at 
5.5 percent and fall slightly to 5.3 percent in 2005.2 By historical standards these 
unemployment rates are quite low, but compared to the peak of the 1990s boom they are 
one full point above the jobless rate at that time. They reflect a growing economy, but 
with “looser” labor markets. 
 
If policy makers and the public view these forecasts as the most likely path that the 
economy will take, what are their implications for the labor market prospects of young 
less skilled Americans, especially young nonenrolled minorities? Will they act as a 
limiting factor on the ability of the economy to improve the absolute and relative 
economic positions of these groups? How many fewer young less skilled Americans will 
be pulled into the labor market? If these macroeconomic forecasts are realized, what are 
their implications for crime? What are their implications for former welfare recipients 
trying to obtain employment? What are their implications on the funding of social 
programs? 
 
This chapter first estimates the differential impact that macroeconomic conditions 
(aggregate demand) have on the employment-population ratios, employment rates (1 
minus the unemployment rate), and labor force participation rates of nonenrolled 16- to 
24-year-olds by race/ethnicity, gender, and educational attainment. The chapter adds to a 
large literature that shows there are different relationships between macroeconomic 
                                                 
2Over the next two years, the Congressional Budget Office’s forecasts are similar, 
ending at 5.6 percent during 2004 and falling slightly to 5.2 percent in 2005. 
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policies and various socio-economic groups and attempts to explain the constant 2 to 1 
ratio of the black-white unemployment rate.3 
 
The findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
• nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-old African Americans are the most cyclically 
sensitive demographic group. From 1970 to 2003, a one-point increase in the national 
unemployment rate is associated with a 6.4 percent decline in their employment-
population ratio; 
 
• nonenrolled 16 to 24 year old Hispanics are the second most sensitive to changes 
in macroeconomic conditions. A one-point increase in the U.S. unemployment rate is 
associated with a 6.0 percent decline in their employment-population ratio; 
 
• nonenrolled less-educated men are the third most sensitive to the business cycle, 
with a 2.4 to 3.7 percent decline in their employment-population ratio for a one-point 
increase in the U.S. unemployment rate; and  
 
• for each of these groups, no less than two-thirds of the decline in employment-
population ratios is due to individuals moving from employment to unemployment, and 
not from labor force reentry. 
 
The chapter then uses these empirical relationships and the Bush Administration 2004 
and 2005 forecasts of the national unemployment rate to predict the employment-
population ratios, employment rates (1 minus unemployment rate), and labor force 
participation rates of Americans with the least skills, nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-olds. 
The evidence suggests that employment-population ratios of less skilled Americans will 
improve over the next decade. However, for most demographic groups, they will not 
return to their values at the peak of the 1990s boom. 
 
During the peak year of the 1990s economic expansion, the employment-population 
ratios of nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-old whites, blacks, and Hispanics were 78.3, 59.5, 
and 70.7 percent. Even with the forecasted drop in unemployment, white and black 
employment-population ratios will not return to their peak values. The Hispanic ratio will 
fall just short of its peak value in 2000. 
 
At the peak of the 1990s boom, the employment-population ratio of nonenrolled high 
school dropout men was 67.7 percent. The employment-population ratio fell to 64.7 
percent in 2003, but it will trend back up to 66.4 percent by 2005. 
 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Hoynes (2000); Thorbecke (1999); Moorthy (1988); Korenman 
and Okun (1989); Spriggs and Williams (2000); Blank and Blinder (1996); Shulman 
(1991); Wilson, Tienda, and Wu (1991); and Badgett (1994). 
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In the next section of this chapter I describe recent macroeconomic trends using 
aggregate published data on GDP growth, industrial production, employment, 
productivity, and real wages. The section shows that based on these measures the 
recession from March 2001 to November 2001 was mild, compared to the 1980s 
recession. In later sections of the chapter, I describe the econometric models that the 
chapter estimates; present estimates of the relationship between aggregate demand and 
the participation, employment, and unemployment of young nonenrolled Americans and 
ten-year forecasts of their labor market outcomes; and discuss the chapter’s findings and 
their implications. 
U.S. MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
 
This section compares and contrasts the economic expansions and the recessions that 
have occurred since 1960. Continuously lower unemployment rates, faster employment 
growth, acceleration in productivity growth, and the growth in real hourly earnings 
distinguish the 1990s boom from previous booms. A smaller rise in unemployment, a 
smaller drop in employment, continued productivity, and real hourly earnings growth 
differentiate the recession that started in March 2001 from past recessions. The impact of 
the most recent recession on the less skilled, especially less skilled African Americans, 
appears not to have been as severe as in past recessions, but compared to prime-age 
workers, less skilled workers disproportionately bore the brunt of the slowdown. The 
remainder of this section summarizes these trends in greater detail. 
 
As measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the economy expanded 
by 40.0 percent during the 1990s boom, compared to 36.9 percent during the 1980s 
boom.4 The average annual increase in GDP was also greater during the 1990s expansion. 
Growth in industrial production during the 1990s was over four times greater than during 
the 1980s. Although not back to its growth rates of the 1960s, productivity grew at a 
faster rate during the 1990s economic expansion than during the 1980s expansion. From 
1991 to 2000, productivity grew at an average annual rate of 2.1 percent from 1991 to 
2000, compared to 1.8 percent from 1982 to 1990. Poverty among families fell more in 
the 1990s than in the 1980s: by 2.9 versus 1.9 percent. 
 
Job growth was similar across expansions. From November 1982 to July 1990, 21 
million new jobs were created, compared to 24 million new jobs from March 1991 to 
March 2001. However, the composition of job growth differed across expansions. During 
the 1980s expansion, 42 percent of the newly created jobs were in service industries, 
compared to 53 percent in the 1990s expansion. 
 
A very different pattern exists in real hourly earnings. Inflation was moderate over 
both periods, with average annual increases of 3.5 and 3.4 percent. So, movements in 
nominal hourly wages explain the stagnation and subsequent growth in real earnings 
during the 1990s. Prior to 1996, average real hourly earnings of nonagricultural private 
                                                 
4 The NBER Dating Committee designated the periods from November 1982 to July 
1990 and March 1991 to March 2001 as expansions. 
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sector workers remained at approximately $13.28 (2001 dollars). In 1996, real hourly 
earnings began to rise for the first time in over a decade, jumping to $13.34 and 
continuing to rise to $13.88 in 1998. Real hourly earnings finished the boom at $14.33. 
 
Turning to aggregate labor market trends, substantial declines in unemployment 
occurred during the two booms. The employment-population ratio and labor force 
participation rate exhibited smaller increases during the 1990s expansion, presumably 
due to the higher initial ratios. The employment-population ratio increased by 5.5 
percentage points from November 1982 to July 1990 and by 2.5 points from March 1991 
to March 2001, while labor force participation increased by 2.3 and 0.8 percent, 
respectively. In summary, these macroeconomic indicators point to a stronger economy 
during the 1990s. 
 
I now shift to summarizing the patterns of the recessions that have occurred since 
December 1969. The 8-month recent recession that ended in November 2001 is tied for 
the second shortest recession on record since 1960. Over this 44-year period, a tie exists 
for the longest recession. Recessions of 16 months lasted from July 1981 to November 
1982 and November 1973 to March 1975. Other lengthy recessions lasted from 
December 1969 to November 1970 and April 1960 to February 1961. The shortest 
recessions lasted 6 months, from January 1980 to July 1980, and 8 months, from July 
1990 to March 1991. 
 
As measured by real GDP growth, the economy expanded by 0.12 percent per quarter 
during the 2001 recession, compared to 0.53 and 1.09 percent contractions during the 
1980s recessions (Figure 1). Industrial production has fallen but nowhere near its decline 
in the 1980s. From March 2001 to November 2001, industrial production fell at an 
average monthly rate of 0.42 percent, compared to 0.85 percent during the January 1980 
to July 1980 recession (Figure 2). Private sector employment during the 8-month 2001 
recession contracted by 2.0 million, 600,000 fewer than during the 16-month recession 
from July 1981 to November 1982 (Figure 3). 
 
<<FIGURES 1-3 HERE>> 
 
Productivity and real wage growth behaved quite differently during the current 
recession. Productivity continued to grow at a rapid pace, compared to previous 
recessions. Productivity grew at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent from the first 
quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2001, compared to 0.2 percent from July 1981 to 
November 1982. The recession that ran from the fourth quarter of 1969 to the fourth 
quarter of 1970 saw productivity grow at 1.8 percent (Figure 4). Inflation-adjusted hourly 
wages continued to rise during the recession, making the current recession the only one in 
which nominal wage growth has stayed ahead of inflation (Figure 5). 
 
<<FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE>> 
 
Figure 6 plots the annual and October unemployment rates of men and women aged 
16 and older. I provide this comparison because the employment-population ratios, 
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unemployment rates, and labor force participation rates of nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-
olds used in the regression analysis come from the October supplement of the Current 
Population Survey. The figure shows that the two series closely track each other, 
indicating that our estimates of the relationships between the labor market outcomes of 
nonenrolled young adults and the national unemployment rates will be independent of 
whether the annual average or October national unemployment rates are used to proxy for 
aggregate demand. 
 
<<FIGURE 6 HERE>> 
 
Figures 7 to 9 compare the labor market outcomes of nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-old 
whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. Over the full length of the series, nonenrolled 
whites have higher employment-population ratios than African Americans and Hispanics. 
The African American ratio jumps from 50 to 60 percent during the 1990s boom, but a 
more than 15-point difference still remains between African Americans and whites. The 
Hispanic ratio also grew rapidly during the 1990s boom, jumping from around 60 to 70 
percent. The labor force participation of African Americans and Hispanics both 
increased, but the key to the large increases in African American and Hispanic 
employment-population ratios was the decline in each group’s unemployment rate that 
occurred during the 1990s boom. Although still too high, the African American and 
Hispanic unemployment rates fell to around 20 and 9 percent, both series records.  
 
<<FIGURES 7-9 HERE>> 
 
Describing the labor market experiences of 16- to 24-year-old men and women by 
educational attainment reveals that high school dropouts have the greatest variation in 
employment-population ratios from 1970 to 2003 (Figure 10). After deteriorating during 
the 1980s recession, the labor market outcomes of high school dropouts recovered, but 
not to the levels that preceded the recession. High school graduates have higher 
employment-population ratios than dropouts, but they, too, fell during the 1980s 
recession and did not return to the pre-recession levels. The 1990s boom had a modest 
impact on their ratios. Holzer and Offner (2004) also find similar evidence. The gains 
were not strong enough to counter the long-term structural decline in participation.5  
 
<<FIGURE 10 HERE>> 
 
Figure 10 presents some of the most startling trends. They show the labor market 
statistics for nonenrolled women by educational attainment. The charts clearly 
demonstrate the collective effects that welfare reform and the tight labor market had on 
employment-population ratios. The employment-population ratios of nonenrolled high 
school dropout women jumped from 30 percent to almost 50 percent from 1996 to 2000, 
while the employment-population ratio of high school graduates increased modestly over 
                                                 
5 The white teenage record was set in August 1978. The black teenage record was set 
in June 1998. 
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the same period. Because of the timing, much of this jump is due to increased labor force 
participation. The unemployment rate for high school dropout women began to fall prior 
to welfare reform, from over 30 percent to around 20 percent. Participation made its 
biggest increases after 1996. Even at the boom’s peak in 2000, however, participation of 
nonenrolled high school dropout women remained 15 points below the participation of 
nonenrolled women with high school diplomas. 
METHODS 
 
To identify the relationships between aggregate demand and the labor market outcomes 
of nonenrolled young adults, I estimate the simple model used in the widely cited Clark 
and Summers (1981, 1990) studies. Although simplistic by today’s time series methods, 
their model provides a clear and straightforward framework for describing the cyclical 
behavior of employment, unemployment, and participation. These three measures are 
used to summarize the labor market outcomes of a particular demographic group. For the 
ith demographic group (e.g., nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-old African Americans), the 
three measures are related by the following identity: 
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where E denotes employment, N denotes the civilian population, and L denotes the labor  
force. 
 
This identity indicates that the employment-population ratio (E/N, share of the 
civilian population employed) is the product of the employment rate (E/L, 1 minus the 
unemployment rate) and the participation rate (L/N, share of civilian population in the 
labor force). A change in the share of the civilian population that is employed can be 
sorted into two components: a change in the unemployment rate and a change in the 
participation rate. To make it easier to measure the contribution of each component, 
Clark and Summers take the natural logarithm of Equation 1. This transformation of the 
identity also has the benefit of allowing us to describe each component’s contribution in 
percent. 
 
Formally, taking logarithms and differentiating Equation 1 yields the decomposition: 
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Changes in the employment-population ratio can be decomposed into changes in 
employment and participation rates. People in the labor force are either employed or 
unemployed, which implies that: 
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where UR denotes the unemployment rate. Clark and Summers use this decomposition to 
provide the basis for estimating the effects of overall macroeconomic performance on 
youth employment. 
 
To place this model into an empirical framework, Clark and Summers assume that the 
employment rate (1 minus unemployment rate) and participation rate for each group 
depend on aggregate demand, seasonal factors, and time. The latter captures the average 
annual change in variables that have not been included in the equation. Seasonal changes 
in the data are modeled using monthly dummy variables. The specifications for the 
participation and employment rate (1 minus unemployment rate) are: 
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where URATE denotes the unemployment rate, the proxy for aggregate demand. Clark 
and Summers use the unemployment rate of men aged 35 to 44 as their proxy for 
aggregate demand. I present models that utilize the national unemployment rate. Both are 
assumed to describe the variation in job opportunities and the ease of finding a job. Many 
workers, especially teenagers, may react slowly to changes in the availability of 
employment. Because of this, lagged values of the unemployment rate are included in the 
model. The term T denotes a time trend that starts at the beginning of each series, and T2 
denotes the square of the time trend. 
 
How does one interpret the coefficients of the unemployment rate (URATE)? The 
cyclical sensitivity of the ith demographic group’s participation rate is the sum of the 
unemployment rate coefficients (πPR = ∑βt-j). An estimate of –1.0 implies that a 1 
percentage point increase in the URATE (e.g., from 0.6 to 0.5) generates a 1 percent 
decrease in the ith group’s participation rate (e.g., 0.430 to 0.434). 
 
The earlier identity ensures that the relationship between the employment-population 
ratio and aggregate demand and time can be written as: 
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Equations 4, 5, and 6 can be used to decompose cyclical changes in the employment-
population ratio into its portions due to changes in unemployment and participation, 
because for the ith demographic group: 
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For example, we will be able to determine whether an increase in the employment-
population ratio is due to movements from unemployment to employment and/or 
movements from out of the labor force to employment. 
 
To provide an update to Clark and Summers’ earlier results on teenagers, I estimate 
the models using published monthly data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that span 
from 1954 to 2004. I use monthly data and estimate the models using an eight-month, 
first-degree polynomial distributed lag with the restriction that the coefficient on the ninth 
lag equals zero. I follow Clark and Summers by estimating all the equations with 
maximum likelihood techniques that correct for the positive serial correlation that exist in 
the data. 
 
The models for nonenrolled young adults are estimated with shorter time series. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics did not begin to publish participation, unemployment rates, 
and employment-population ratios for nonenrolled African Americans and Hispanics 
until October 1970 and October 1985. Labor market statistics by educational attainment 
were not published in the October supplement of the CPS until 1970. I estimate the 
models using a four-year, first-degree polynomial distributed lag with the restriction that 
the coefficient on the fourth lag equals zero. 6 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents for white teenagers estimates of the πEN, π(1-UR), and πPR , the sum of the 
coefficients on the unemployment rate in the distributed lag. They serve as a benchmark 
to Clark and Summers’ estimates, which were based on quarterly data from 1954 to 1976. 
Column 1 reports the estimated relationships when the unemployment rate of men aged 
35 to 44 is used as the proxy for aggregate demand, and Column 2 reports the estimated 
relationships with the U.S. unemployment rate. Both measures of aggregate demand 
exhibit the strong relationship between the health of the macroeconomy and youth labor 
market outcomes that Clark and Summers found. For white teenagers, a one-point 
increase in the prime-age male unemployment rate decreases the employment-population 
ratio of the teen population by 3.5 percent.7 Over one-half of the decline comes through a 
decrease in the employment rate (1 minus the unemployment rate). Constraining the 
employment-population ratio’s effect to equal the sum of the participation and 
                                                 
6 Just as Clark and Summers experiment with different lag structures, I also tried 
different structures and found that the estimates of the cyclical response were robust to 
choice of lag structures. 
 
7 Using quarterly data from 1954 to 1976, Clark and Summers (1981,1990) obtain an 
estimate for teenage white women and men of 4.25 and 4.4 percent, with 2.78 and 2.38 
points of the relationship coming from a decline in participation. 
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employment rates’ effects yields a coefficient of –3.5.8 Using the national unemployment 
rate as the proxy for aggregate demand generates a 3.1 percent decline in the 
employment-population ratio, with a decline in participation having the same relative 
importance. The relationship is robust to constraining the employment-population ratio’s 
effect to equal the sum of the effects of the employment and labor force participation 
rates. 
 
<<TABLE 1 HERE>> 
 
Table 2 presents the estimates for white and black teenagers over the length of each 
group’s series (e.g, white teenagers: January 1954 to November 2004).9 Extending the 
series of white teenagers to November 2004 indicates that white teenagers remain quite 
sensitive to the macroeconomy. A one-point increase in the unemployment rate of men 
aged 35 to 44 generates a 1.5 percent decline in the employment-population ratio. All of 
the response comes from employment (1 minus unemployment rate). Utilizing the 
national unemployment rate as the measure of aggregated demand leads to a smaller 
estimate of 1.2 percent, again with all of the relationship attributable to a decline in the 
employment rate of white teens. 
 
<<TABLE 2 HERE>> 
 
Black teens are more than five times as sensitive to fluctuations in aggregate demand 
than white teens. Both unemployment rate specifications indicate that a one-point 
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 9.0 to 9.5 percent decline in their 
employment rate. Almost 60 percent of the employment-population ratio’s decline is due 
to an increase in the time needed to find a job. 
 
I now shift to describing the sensitivity of the volume’s target population, nonenrolled 
less skilled Americans, to macroeconomic fluctuations. Table 3 presents by age, race, 
gender, and educational attainment estimates of the πEN, π(1-UR), and πPR the sum of the 
coefficients on the unemployment rate in the distributed lag for nonenrolled young adults. 
These estimates do not constrain a change in the employment-population ratio to equal 
the sum of the change in the unemployment and participation rates as shown in Equation 
7. The estimates are consistent with Clark and Summers and others. They exhibit strong 
relationships between the health of the macroeconomy and labor market outcomes of 
teenagers and young adults. A one-point increase in the U.S. unemployment rate lowers 
the employment-population ratios of nonenrolled 16- to 19- and 20- to 24-year-olds by 
0.72 and 0.76 percent, with the decline in each group’s employment-population ratio 
coming from reductions in its employment rate. 
 
                                                 
8 I obtain this value by summing –1.938 and –1.004, the estimates for the 
employment and participation rates in Column 1 of Table 1. 
 
9 Monthly labor force information on Hispanic teenagers is not published.  
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<<TABLE 3 HERE>> 
 
Nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-old African Americans, high school dropout men, and 
Hispanics are the most sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. For nonenrolled whites, a 
one-point increase in the unemployment rate lowers their employment-population ratio 
by 1.0 percent. All of the declines come through a decrease in their employment rate. A 
one-point increase in the U.S. unemployment rate lowers the employment-population 
ratios of African Americans and Hispanics by 6.4 and 6.0 percent. For African 
Americans, all of the reduction is due to weaker job prospects; two-thirds of the reduction 
in the Hispanic employment-population ratio is due to weaker job prospects. 
 
Table 3’s estimates show that the employment-population ratios of nonenrolled 16- to 
24-year-old men and women have different responses to a change in the U.S. 
unemployment rate. A one-point increase in the unemployment rate lowers women’s 
employment-population ratio by 0.50 percent, compared to 1.85 percent for men. All of 
the reductions are due to a decline in each group’s employment rate. Once the data are 
disggregated by educational attainment, however, the variation in experience expands. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 indicates that nonenrolled high school dropouts, especially men, 
have the largest sensitivity to changes in the U.S. unemployment rate. A one-point 
increase in the U.S. unemployment rate lowers the employment-population ratio of 
nonenrolled high school dropout men by 3.7 percent; this figure is 1.9 percent for 
women. All of the reductions in the employment rate explain the decline. As one would 
expect, the sensitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations falls as educational attainment 
rises; however, the importance of the employment rate in explaining falling employment-
population ratios does not diminish. 
 
In summary, my measure of aggregate demand, the U.S. unemployment rate, provides 
continued confirmation of the long-held view of the least skilled as the most likely to be 
“last hired” and “first fired,” with minorities and less educated men and women the most 
susceptible to macroeconomic downturns. Education and skills remain one of the best 
protections against cyclical downturns in the economy. 
 
I now put the estimated coefficients in Table 3 to use. Using 2003 as the base year, I 
first simulate the impact that increases in the national unemployment rate have on the 
labor market outcomes of nonenrolled teenagers and young adults. The simulation can be 
viewed as a “what if” exercise of the economy stalling and experiencing a mild or severe 
recession. An increase in the unemployment rate of 2.0 percentage points would push the 
U.S. unemployment rate from 6.0 to 8.0 percent, which would still be well below the 
peak of the 1980s recession. An increase in the unemployment rate by 4.0 percentage 
points would be considered a severe recession, moving the unemployment rate to 10.0 
percent, the peak of the 1980’s recession. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reveals that a 2.0 point increase in the U.S unemployment rate 
would lower the teenage employment-population ratio by 1.2 percentage points from 56.6 
to 55.4 percent, compared to a 1.7 point drop in the 20- to 24-year-old employment-
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population ratio. For both age groups, the decline in the employment-population ratio is 
solely due to a fall in the employment rate. A severe recession (an increase in the national 
unemployment rate of 4.0 points) would lower the teenage employment-population ratio 
to 52.6 percent and the young adult employment-population ratio to 68.7 percent. The 
reduction in the employment-population ratios is predominately due to larger decreases in 
the employment rates. These individuals stay in the labor force. 
 
<<TABLE 4 HERE>> 
 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results from another “what if” calculation. I use the 
estimates in Table 3, the October 2003 average employment, participation, and 
unemployment rates, and forecasts of the U.S. unemployment rate over the next decade to 
generate estimates of what the path of employment, participation, and unemployment 
might look like for nonenrolled young adults. For a point of comparison, the table also 
contains the peak values for the 1990s boom.  
 
The entries in Panel B suggest that teenage employment will slowly rise as the 
national unemployment rate falls from 6.0 percent in 2003 to 5.5 percent in 2004, and to 
5.3 percent in 2005. At the end of the forecast period, the teenage employment-
population ratio will be 6.5 points below its peak during the 1990s boom. The 
employment-population ratio of 20- to 24-year-olds will be 4.1 percentage points below 
its 1990s peak. Since the erosion in employment is forecast to be slightly larger for 
teenagers than young adults, a small expansion in the gap will occur. The key result in 
this table is that the failure of the employment-population ratio to return to its peak levels 
is due to lower employment rates (higher unemployment rates), which are the result of a 
higher national unemployment rate. 
 
To illustrate the macroeconomy’s recent inability to absorb the least-skilled 
Americans, I construct the following calculation. If the 2004 forecast of a 5.5 percent 
U.S. unemployment rate occurs, then compared to 3.9 percent, the boom’s lowest 
unemployment rate, there will be 943,000 fewer less skilled Americans employed. To 
generate these estimates, I first multiply the 2004 forecast of the demographic group 
(e.g., 16- to 24-year-olds) by its civilian population in 2003. This product equals the 
predicted employment level in 2004, assuming zero population growth. The calculation 
for nonenrolled 16- to 24-year-olds is 0.709*15,903,000 = 11,275,227. I then compare 
this predicted level of 2004 employment to the level of employment in 2000 (12,218,000 
– 11,275,227 = 942,773). The difference is the reduction in nonenrolled employment that 
can be attributed to a higher U.S. unemployment rate. 
 
Table 5 presents simulations by race and ethnicity. Focusing on the forecast in Panel 
B reveals that after falling to 74.4, 54.9, and 67.5 percent for nonenrolled whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics, respectively, the employment-population ratios are predicted to rise over 
the next two years. The white employment-population ratio will fall short of its 1990s 
peak by 3.4 points. The employment-population ratio of blacks will fall short of its 1990s 
peak by 2.1 percentage points, and the Hispanic employment-population ratio will also 
fall short of its 1990s peak, by 0.3 points.  
 13
<<TABLE 5 HERE>> 
 
Assuming no population growth, the forecasts in Table 5 imply that since the boom’s 
peak in 2000, the economy has not been able to absorb 773,000 nonenrolled young 
whites, 213,000 nonenrolled young blacks; however the number of nonenrolled young 
Hispanics has risen by 240,000, due in part to the growth in their population.10  
 
Table 6 shifts to comparing the future experience of nonenrolled men and women. At 
the higher national jobless rates not all of those that will be searching for jobs will be able 
to obtain employment. The men’s employment-population ratio is forecast to be 3.6 
percentage points below its peak during the 1990s boom. The women’s employment-
population ratio is predicted to be 4.3 percentage points below its peak. 
 
<<TABLE 6 HERE>> 
 
We conclude with forecasts that disaggregate by educational attainment and gender. 
Panel B of Tables 7 and 8 indicate that the forecasted national unemployment rates will 
not be low enough to absorb the least educated of the nonenrolled. Employment-
population ratios of both male and female high school dropouts and graduates will be 
several percentage points below their peak values obtained during the 1990s boom. 
 
<<TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE>> 
 
Assuming that the civilian population for these sub-populations does not grow from 
2003 to 2005, the implied number of nonenrolled men and women that the economy will 
not pull in is approximately 983,000, with 870,000 or 88 percent of these young adults 
possessing no more than a high school diploma. 
 
These results provide a potentially sobering picture of the future for America’s 
nonenrolled youth, especially minorities, men and women with low levels of education. 
The Administration forecasts an unemployment rate for 2004 of 5.5 percent—which, 
given that the average actual unemployment rate for January to November is 5.53 
percent. The forecast will most likely occur. The estimates in this section suggest that 
when the jobless rate fell to 3.9 percent, at the boom’s peak, 942,000 additional 
nonenrolled young adults found jobs. In the absence of the extremely tight labor markets 
                                                 
10 These estimates are constructed as follows: multiply the 2004 forecast of the 
demographic group (e.g., nonenrolled whites) by its civilian population in 2003. This 
product equals the predicted employment level in 2004, assuming that population 
remained constant. The calculation for nonenrolled whites is 0.748*12,570,000 = 
9,402,360. Compare this predicted level of 2004 employment to the level of employment 
in 2000 (10,175,000 – 9,402,360 = 772,640). The difference is the decline in employment 
that we attribute to a higher national unemployment rate. For nonenrolled blacks the 
predicted difference is 213,385 [1,543,000 – (0.567*2,345,000)]. For nonenrolled 
Hispanics, the predicted difference is –239800 [2,151,000 – (0.695*3,440,000)]. 
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of the late 1990s, policy makers will have to find other ways to reduce barriers to job 
search, entry, and retention and to cushion the effects that technological change and 
globalization may have on the labor market opportunities of the less skilled. These 
strategies become even more important as the Federal Reserve continues with its 
increases in the federal funds rate, which will act to slow the economy. Carpenter and 
Rodgers (2004) show that contractionary monetary policy has a disparate negative effect 
on the employment-population ratio of the least skilled. 
DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter looks forward, presenting estimates of the economic opportunities that less 
skilled Americans will experience over the next ten years. The Bush Administration 
forecasts that the U.S. unemployment rate will fall to 5.5 percent in 2004, and fall to 5.3 
percent in 2005. These national unemployment rates will reflect a growing economy, but 
with a significantly “looser” labor market. This chapter shows that if current policies 
continue, the future macroeconomy will not exhibit the breadth and depth of the 1990s 
boom. 
 
The chapter reinforces the view that young nonenrolled African Americans are the 
most cyclically sensitive demographic group. A one-point increase in the U.S. 
unemployment rate is associated with a 6.4 percent decline in their employment-
population ratio, with the declines coming from an increase in their unemployment rate. 
The chapter’s most startling result is that the employment-population ratio of nonenrolled 
less educated men and women are extremely sensitive to the macroeconomy. Both results 
have implications for how a “work first” philosophy toward social safety nets, such as 
welfare, can successfully function. The results have implications for the ability of ex-
offenders to find jobs.  
 
The chapter then uses these empirical relationships and economy-wide Bush 
Administration forecasts to predict employment-population ratios, labor force 
participation rates, and employment rates (one minus the unemployment rate) of 
nonenrolled young adults over the next ten years. The evidence indicates that the 
employment-population ratios of young nonenrolled adults will improve over the next 
decade. However, the ratios will not return to the record lows of the 1990s boom. The 
lower employment-population ratios will reflect lower employment rates (higher 
unemployment rates), especially for nonenrolled blacks, nonenrolled men and women 
with a high school diploma or less. 
 
If the 2004 forecast of the U.S. unemployment rate of 5.5 percent is realized, then, 
since the peak of the expansion in 2000, approximately 940,000 fewer less skilled 
Americans will be employed. To date, the average U.S. unemployment rate over the first 
eleven months of 2004 is 5.53 percent, and many experts believe that the jobless rate will 
fall modestly in 2005. 
 
What implications does having a higher national unemployment rate have on social 
policy? First, if the Bush Administration forecasts come to pass, the economy will not 
provide the breadth and depth of opportunities that it did during the 1990s. Second, the 
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macroeconomic policy that underpins these forecasts provides an upper bound on less 
skilled employment-population ratios. Furthermore, if policy makers seek to raise the 
employment-population ratios of nonenrolled young adults, they will have to make skill 
investments and find other vehicles to stimulate aggregate demand. More generally, 
unless these actions are taken, the pool of untapped (unemployed and out of the labor 
force, but want a job) and partially tapped (working part-time for economic reasons) 
individuals will continue to grow over the next ten years, and “work first” employment 
and welfare policies will not be as successful. Ex-offenders will have greater difficulty 
finding employment. Communities in the Mississippi Delta, Appalachia, and others 
throughout the U.S. that have persistently high unemployment and poverty rates will not 
be left behind. 
 
What are some policies that could be utilized to strengthen the employment of less 
skilled Americans? First, there are policies that foster continuously tight labor markets. 
Finding out why the tremendous fiscal stimulus in the form of tax cuts and expenditures 
on Iraq, Afghanistan and homeland security have produced less on the jobs front than the 
Administration and independent analysts hoped it would, and seeking ways to re-couple 
economic and employment growth are of extreme importance. 
 
Building the skills of adults and youth in a slowing growing economy will be crucial, 
especially for nonenrolled young adults. Also, raising the value of work via reasonable 
increases in the minimum wage and creation of living wages and expansions in the 
Earned Income Tax Credit will add to the future wage growth and productivity of less 
skilled Americans.  
 
Another group of programs includes holistic geographic grant approaches, such as the 
Youth Opportunity Grants that target funds to and coordinate resources in areas with high 
unemployment and poverty rates.  
 
Policies that remove barriers to work are also a part of this comprehensive strategy 
for work. Today, it is the rule rather than the exception that both parents work, and it goes 
without saying that single parents have to work. Because of this, access to “high quality” 
child care must receive higher priority. Access to transportation must also be a greater 
priority. Research has shown that much of the job growth in recent decades has been in 
suburban areas, which place a greater premium on having an automobile. 
 
Finally —I mention this only in passing, since the topic is addressed elsewhere in this 
book—policies need to be strengthened that address the adverse impact that both 
incarceration and the dramatic growth in arrears has had on less skilled men. 
 
During the late 1990s and in the beginning of 2000, the United States was in an 
excellent fiscal position to make these investments. It was simply a matter of placing the 
welfare of less skilled Americans higher on the list of priorities. Since 2001, however, the 
fiscal position that would make these investments possible has been severely altered. The 
massive revenue shortfalls that have emerged in most state governments and the federal 
government’s fiscal actions will undoubtedly constrain serious efforts to address the 
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needs of less skilled Americans. Years from now, when economic historians write about 
the 1990s boom, many who focus on social policy may label the period as one of missed 
opportunities. 
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Table 1: White Teenagers’ Cyclical Response of Participation, Unemployment, and 
Employment 1954–1976 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable 
Male 35-44 year old 
Unemployment Rate US Unemployment Rate 
ln(EPOP) -3.548 -3.099 
 (0.216) (0.177) 
ln(EMP) -2.073 -1.832 
 (0.087) (0.066) 
ln(LFP) -1.475 -1.265 
 (0.188) (0.159) 
Notes: Author’s calculations using published data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The coefficients are the sum of the coefficients on the 
unemployment rate obtained from an eight-month, polynomial in the first 
degree, with the coefficient on the 9th month set equal to zero. The estimates 
have been corrected for first order serial correlation. 
ln(EPOP): logarithm of the employment population ratio 
ln(LFP): logarithm of the labor force participation ratio 
ln(EMP): logarithm of the employment rate (1 minus the unemployment rate) 
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Table 2: Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment, Participation, and Employment for Teenagers 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Panel A: Male 35-44 year old Unemployment Rate 
Variable White Black 
ln(EPOP) -1.472 -9.450 
 (0.211) (0.337) 
ln(EMP) -1.608 -5.363 
 (0.049) (0.226) 
ln(LFP) 0.133 -4.099 
 (0.194) (0.250) 
Panel B: US Unemployment Rate 
Variable White Black 
ln(EPOP) -1.242 -9.036 
 (0.203) (0.288) 
ln(EMP) -1.652 -5.238 
 (0.039) (0.190) 
ln(LFP) 0.408 -3.810 
 (0.183) (0.231) 
Notes: The coefficients in Panel A are the sum of the coefficients on the 
unemployment rate of men aged 35 to 44 obtained from an eight-month, 
polynomial in the first degree, with the coefficient on the 9th month set equal 
to zero. The coefficients in Panel B are the sum of the coefficients on the U.S. 
unemployment rate obtained from an eight-month, polynomial in the first 
degree, with the coefficient on the 9th month set equal to zero. All models 
contain month dummy variables and time trends. They have also been 
corrected for first-order serial correlation. The white teen series runs from 
January 1954 to November 2004. The black teen series runs from January 1972 
to November 2004. 
ln(EPOP): logarithm of the employment population ratio 
ln(LFP): logarithm of the labor force participation ratio 
ln(EMP): logarithm of the employment rate (1 minus the unemployment rate) 
 
21 
Table 3: Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment, Employment, and Participation of Nonenrolled 16–24-Year-Olds 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Panel A:  Age Race and Ethnicity Gender 
Variable: 16-24 16-19 20-24 White Black Hispanic Men Women 
ln(EPOP) -0.762 -0.717 -0.755 -1.019 -6.403 -5.993 -1.846 -0.459 
 (0.357) (0.455) (0.324) (0.576) (1.293) (0.789) (0.368) (0.502) 
ln(EMP) -1.636 -2.904 -1.537 -1.673 -6.347 -3.968 -1.987 -1.244 
 (0.253) (0.437) (0.238) (0.370) (1.056) (0.779) (0.314) (0.235) 
ln(LFP) 0.468 1.411 0.289 0.655 -0.034 -2.025 0.189 0.855 
 (0.189) (0.440) (0.174) (0.368) (0.643) (0.770) (0.105) (0.407) 
Panel B: Men Women 
Variable: 
High School 
Dropout 
High School 
Graduates 
Some 
College 
College 
Graduates 
High School 
Dropout 
High School 
Graduates Some College
College 
Graduates 
ln(EPOP) -3.692 -2.442 -2.027 -0.210 -1.879 -1.302 -0.341 -0.977 
 (0.971) (0.683) (0.443) (0.615) (2.514) (0.883) (0.546) (0.649) 
ln(EMP) -3.808 -1.732 -1.727 -0.195 -4.414 -2.077 -1.142 -1.136 
 (0.832) (0.474) (0.383) (0.504) (1.006) (0.360) (0.346) (0.392) 
ln(LFP) 0.107 -0.542 -0.295 -0.015 2.541 0.796 0.711 0.145 
 (0.440) (0.238) (0.236) (0.303) (2.111) (0.683) (0.492) (0.424) 
Notes: The coefficients are the sum of the coefficients on the U.S. unemployment rate obtained from a four-year, polynomial in the 
first degree, with the coefficient on fifth year set equal to zero. All models contain a time trend and have been corrected for first-order 
serial correlation. All data are from October. The series by age run from October 1953 to October 2003. The series for whites and 
blacks run from 1970 to 2003 and for Hispanic from 1985 to 2003. The series by gender run from 1953 to 2003. The series by gender 
and education run from 1970 to 2003. 
ln(EPOP): logarithm of the employment population ratio 
ln(LFP): logarithm of the labor force participation ratio 
ln(EMP): logarithm of the employment rate (1 minus the unemployment rate) 
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Table 4: Simulations of Changes in the U.S. Unemployment on the Cyclical Behavior of Nonenrolled 16–24-
Year-Olds by Age 
Panel A: Assuming 1.0 point increases in US Unemployment Rate 
   
Percentage Point Increase in 
Unemployment Rate 
Age 16-24 Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 
EPOP 75.2% 70.6% 70.1% 69.0% 67.4% 65.4% 
EMP 90.9% 86.9% 85.5% 82.7% 78.6% 73.5% 
LFP 82.7% 81.3% 81.7% 82.4% 83.6% 85.2% 
Age 16-19 
EPOP 63.4% 56.6% 56.2% 55.4% 54.2% 52.6% 
EMP 83.2% 77.8% 75.5% 71.2% 65.0% 57.4% 
LFP 76.3% 72.7% 73.7% 75.8% 79.0% 83.5% 
Age 20-24 
EPOP 78.6% 74.1% 73.5% 72.4% 70.8% 68.7% 
EMP 92.9% 88.9% 87.5% 84.8% 80.9% 76.0% 
LFP 84.6% 83.4% 83.6% 84.1% 84.9% 85.8% 
 
Panel B: Assuming Bush Administration Forecasts of the U.S. Unemployment Rate 
   Forecast 
 Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 2004 2005 
U.S. Unemployment Rate 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.3 
Age 16-24     
EPOP 75.2% 70.6% 70.9% 71.0% 
EMP 90.9% 86.9% 87.6% 87.9% 
LFP 82.7% 81.3% 81.1% 81.0% 
Age 16-19 
EPOP 63.4% 56.6% 56.8% 56.9% 
EMP 83.2% 77.8% 78.9% 79.4% 
LFP 76.3% 72.7% 72.2% 72.0% 
Age 20-24 
EPOP 78.6% 74.1% 74.4% 74.5% 
EMP 92.9% 88.9% 89.6% 89.9% 
LFP 84.6% 83.4% 83.3% 83.2% 
Notes: Author’s calculations using published data from the October Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Base year corresponds to the year in which the impact of an increase in 
the unemployment rate is based.  
EMP: 1 minus the unemployment rate 
LFP: Labor force participation rate 
EPOP: Employment Population Ratio 
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Table 5: Simulations of an Increase in the Unemployment Rate on the Cyclical Behavior of Nonenrolled  
16–24-Year-Olds 
by Race and Ethnicity 
Panel A: Assuming 1.0 point increases in US Unemployment Rate 
   Percentage Point Increase in Unemployment Rate
White Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 
EPOP 78.3% 74.4% 73.6% 72.1% 69.9% 67.1% 
EMP 92.6% 89.5% 88.0% 85.1% 80.8% 75.4% 
LFP 84.6% 83.1% 83.6% 84.7% 86.4% 88.7% 
Black 
EPOP 59.5% 54.9% 51.4% 52.0% 52.8% 54.0% 
EMP 81.3% 73.9% 69.2% 60.4% 48.9% 36.5% 
LFP 73.2% 74.3% 74.3% 74.2% 74.1% 74.0% 
Hispanic 
EPOP 70.7% 67.5% 63.5% 55.8% 45.8% 34.8% 
EMP 91.8% 87.7% 84.2% 77.5% 68.3% 57.5% 
LFP 77.0% 77.0% 75.4% 72.4% 68.0% 62.5% 
 
Panel B: Assuming Bush Administration Forecasts of the U.S. Unemployment Rate 
   Forecast 
 Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 2004 2005 
White 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.3 
EPOP 78.3% 74.4% 74.8% 74.9% 
EMP 92.6% 89.5% 90.2% 90.6% 
LFP 84.6% 83.1% 82.8% 82.7% 
Black 
EPOP 59.5% 54.9% 56.7% 57.4% 
EMP 81.3% 73.9% 76.2% 77.2% 
LFP 73.2% 74.3% 74.3% 74.3% 
Hispanic 
EPOP 70.7% 67.5% 69.5% 70.4% 
EMP 91.8% 87.7% 89.4% 90.1% 
LFP 77.0% 77.0% 77.8% 78.1% 
Notes: Author’s calculations using published data from the October Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Based year corresponds to the year in which the impact of an increase in the 
unemployment rate is based.  
EMP: 1 minus the unemployment rate 
LFP: Labor force participation rate 
EPOP: Employment Population Ratio 
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Table 6: Simulations of an Increase in the Unemployment Rate on the Cyclical Behavior of Nonenrolled  
16–24 Year Olds 
by Gender 
Panel A: Assuming 1.0 point increases in US Unemployment Rate 
   Percentage Point Increase in Unemployment Rate
Men Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 
EPOP 80.5% 75.9% 74.5% 71.7% 67.8% 62.8% 
EMP 90.7% 86.9% 85.2% 81.8% 76.9% 70.8% 
LFP 88.7% 87.4% 87.6% 87.9% 88.4% 89.1% 
Women 
EPOP 69.4% 64.9% 64.6% 64.0% 63.1% 62.0% 
EMP 91.0% 87.0% 85.9% 83.8% 80.7% 76.6% 
LFP 76.3% 74.6% 75.2% 76.5% 78.5% 81.2% 
 
Panel B: Assuming Bush Administration Forecasts of the U.S. Unemployment Rate 
   Forecast 
 Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 2004 2005 
U.S. Unemployment Rate 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.3 
Men     
EPOP 80.5% 75.9% 76.6% 76.9% 
EMP 90.7% 86.9% 87.8% 88.1% 
LFP 88.7% 87.4% 87.3% 87.3% 
Women 
EPOP 69.4% 64.9% 65.0% 65.1% 
EMP 91.0% 87.0% 87.5% 87.8% 
LFP 76.3% 74.6% 74.3% 74.2% 
Notes: Author’s calculations using published data from the October Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Base year corresponds to the year in which the impact of an increase in the 
unemployment rate is based.  
EMP: 1 minus the unemployment rate 
LFP: Labor force participation rate 
EPOP: Employment Population Ratio 
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Table 7: Simulations of an Increase in the Unemployment Rate on the Cyclical Behavior of Nonenrolled 16–
24-Year-Old Men by Educational Attainment 
Panel A: Assuming 1.0 point increases in US Unemployment Rate 
   Percentage Point Increase in Unemployment Rate
High School Dropout Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 
EPOP 67.7% 64.7% 62.3% 57.7% 51.3% 43.7% 
EMP 83.7% 81.7% 78.6% 72.6% 64.3% 54.5% 
LFP 80.9% 79.2% 79.3% 79.5% 79.7% 80.0% 
High School Graduate 
EPOP 81.3% 76.3% 74.4% 70.8% 65.6% 59.2% 
EMP 90.7% 86.5% 85.0% 82.1% 77.8% 72.4% 
LFP 89.6% 88.2% 87.7% 86.8% 85.4% 83.5% 
Some College 
EPOP 90.1% 83.9% 82.2% 78.9% 74.1% 68.1% 
EMP 97.0% 90.4% 88.8% 85.8% 81.3% 75.7% 
LFP 92.9% 92.8% 92.5% 92.0% 91.2% 90.1% 
College Graduate 
EPOP 91.1% 86.6% 86.4% 86.1% 85.5% 84.8% 
EMP 94.4% 92.8% 92.6% 92.3% 91.7% 91.0% 
LFP 96.6% 93.3% 93.3% 93.3% 93.2% 93.2% 
 
Panel B: Assuming Bush Administration Forecasts of the U.S. Unemployment Rate 
   Forecast 
 Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 2004 2005 
U.S. Unemployment Rate 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.3 
High School Dropout 
EPOP 67.7% 64.7% 65.9% 66.4% 
EMP 83.7% 81.7% 83.3% 83.9% 
LFP 80.9% 79.2% 79.2% 79.1% 
High School Graduate 
EPOP 81.3% 76.3% 77.2% 77.6% 
EMP 90.7% 86.5% 87.2% 87.6% 
LFP 89.6% 88.2% 88.4% 88.5% 
Some College    
EPOP 90.1% 83.9% 84.8% 85.1% 
EMP 97.0% 90.4% 91.2% 91.5% 
LFP 92.9% 92.8% 92.9% 93.0% 
College Graduate    
EPOP 91.1% 86.6% 86.7% 86.7% 
EMP 94.4% 92.8% 92.9% 92.9% 
LFP 96.6% 93.3% 93.3% 93.3% 
Notes: Author’s calculations using published data from the October Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Base year corresponds to the year in which the impact of an increase in 
the unemployment rate is based.  
EMP: 1 minus the unemployment rate 
LFP: Labor force participation rate 
EPOP: Employment Population Ratio 
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Table 8: Simulations of an Increase in the Unemployment Rate on the Cyclical Behavior of  
Nonenrolled 16–24-Year-Old Women 
by Educational Attainment 
Panel A: Assuming 1.0 point increases in US Unemployment Rate 
   Percentage Point Increase in Unemployment Rate
High School Dropout Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 
EPOP 43.7% 38.2% 37.5% 36.1% 34.0% 31.5% 
EMP 79.7% 75.2% 71.9% 65.5% 56.9% 46.8% 
LFP 54.8% 50.8% 51.3% 51.8% 52.2% 52.6% 
High School Graduate 
EPOP 71.2% 63.2% 62.4% 60.8% 58.4% 55.3% 
EMP 91.2% 85.2% 83.4% 80.0% 75.0% 68.7% 
LFP 78.0% 74.2% 74.8% 76.0% 77.8% 80.3% 
Some College 
EPOP 78.8% 78.5% 78.2% 77.7% 76.9% 75.9% 
EMP 94.1% 91.5% 90.5% 88.4% 85.4% 81.5% 
LFP 83.7% 85.8% 86.4% 87.6% 89.5% 92.1% 
College Graduate 
EPOP 90.9% 85.8% 85.0% 83.3% 80.9% 77.7% 
EMP 96.9% 93.8% 92.7% 90.6% 87.5% 83.6% 
LFP 93.9% 91.5% 91.6% 91.9% 92.3% 92.8% 
 
Panel B: Assuming Bush Administration and the Blue Chip Forecasts of the U.S. Unemployment Rate
   Forecast 
 Peak of Boom (2000) Base Year (2003) 2004 2005 
U.S. Unemployment Rate 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.3 
High School Dropout 
EPOP 43.7% 38.2% 38.6% 38.7% 
EMP 79.7% 75.2% 76.9% 77.5% 
LFP 54.8% 50.8% 50.2% 49.9% 
High School Graduate 
EPOP 71.2% 63.2% 63.6% 63.8% 
EMP 91.2% 85.2% 86.1% 86.4% 
LFP 78.0% 74.2% 73.9% 73.8% 
Some College 
EPOP 78.8% 78.5% 78.6% 78.7% 
EMP 94.1% 91.5% 92.0% 92.2% 
LFP 83.7% 85.8% 85.5% 85.4% 
College Graduate 
EPOP 90.9% 85.8% 86.2% 86.4% 
EMP 96.9% 93.8% 94.3% 94.5% 
LFP 93.9% 91.5% 91.4% 91.4% 
Notes: Author’s calculations using published data from the October Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Base year corresponds to the year in which the impact of an increase in 
the unemployment rate is based.  
EMP: 1 minus the unemployment rate 
LFP: Labor force participation rate 
EPOP: Employment Population Ratio 
Figure 1: Average Quarterly Change in Real GDP 
by Recession
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Notes: Author’s calculations from published Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Recession designations come from the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The NBER has not officially designated March 2002 as the end of the 2001 recession.
Figure 2: Average Monthly Change in Industrial Production by Recession
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Notes: Author’s calculations from published Federal Reserve data. Recession designations come from the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Figure 3: Contraction in Private Sector Employment by Recession
(in thousands)
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Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.
Figure 4: Average Quarterly Change in Productivity
by Recession
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Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Figures are the percent change a quarter ago, at annual rate.
Figure 5: The Pattern of Real Hourly Wages 
by Recession
(October 2004 Dollars)
$13.00
$13.50
$14.00
$14.50
$15.00
$15.50
$16.00
$16.50
$17.00
$17.50
$18.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Month of Recession
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
2001 1990 1981 1980 1973 1969
Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Figure 6: Selected U.S. Unemployment Rates,
1948 to 2004
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Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Figure 7: Employment-Population Ratios of Non-Enrolled 16 to 24 Year olds 
by Race and Ethnicity
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Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Figure 8: Unemployment Rates of Non-Enrolled 16 to 24 Year Olds 
by Race and Ethnicity
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Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics October data.
Figure 9: Labor Force Participation of Non-Enrolled 16 to 24 Year olds
by Race and Ethnicity
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Source: Author’s tabulations from published Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Figure 10: Young Non-Enrolled Male Employment Population Ratio 
by Educational Attainment
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Notes: Chart displays October data from the BLS on 16-24 year olds.
